Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation by Rand, David Gertler et al.
 
Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Rand, David G., Anna Dreber, Tore Ellingsen, Drew Fudenberg,
and Martin A. Nowak. 2009. Positive interactions promote public
cooperation. Science 325(5945): 1272-1275
Published Version doi:10.1126/science.1177418
Accessed February 18, 2015 10:50:43 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3804483
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP1 
 
 
Positive interactions promote public cooperation  
 
 
David G. Rand
1,2*, Anna Dreber
1,6*, Tore Ellingsen
6, Drew Fudenberg
3 & Martin A. Nowak
1,4,5 
 
1Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, 
2Department of Systems Biology, 
3Department of Economics, 
4Department of Mathematics, and 
5Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, USA. 
6Department of Economics, Stockholm School of 
Economics, 11358 Stockholm, Sweden. 
*Joint first authors 
 
The public goods game is the classic laboratory paradigm for studying collective 
action problems. Each participant chooses how much to contribute to a common 
pool  which  returns  benefits  to  all  participants  equally.  The  ideal  outcome  is  if 
everybody contributes the maximum amount, but the self-interested strategy is not 
to contribute anything. Most previous studies have found punishment to be more 
effective  than  reward  for  maintaining  cooperation  in  public  goods  games.  The 
typical design of these studies, however, represses future consequences for today’s 
actions. In an experimental setting, we compare public goods games followed by 
punishment, reward or both in the setting of truly repeated games, where player 
identities  persist  from  round  to  round.  We  show  that  reward  is  as  effective  as 
punishment for maintaining public cooperation and leads to higher total earnings. 
Moreover, when both options are available, reward leads to increased contributions 
and  payoff,  while  punishment  has  no  effect  on  contributions  and  leads  to  lower 
payoff. We conclude that reward outperforms punishment in repeated public goods 
games and that human cooperation in such repeated settings is best supported by 
positive interactions with others.  
 
The Prisoners’ Dilemma illustrates the tension between private and common interest. 
Two people can choose between cooperation and defection. If both cooperate they get 
more  than  if  both  defect.  But  if  one  person  defects  while  the  other  cooperates,  the 
defector  gets  the  highest  payoff  while  the  cooperator  gets  the  lowest.  In  a  one-shot 
Prisoners’ Dilemma it is therefore in each person’s interest to defect. However, if pairs of 
people  play  the  game  repeatedly  it  is  no  longer  obvious  that  defection  promotes  the 
defector’s private interest, because today’s defection may lead the opponent to defect in 
the future. Under suitable conditions, such direct reciprocity can support cooperation (1-
6). Even if people play different opponents in every round, my opponent tomorrow may 
condition  her  choice  on  my  play  today.  Such  indirect  reciprocity  can  also  sustain 
cooperation  (7,  8).  Direct  and  indirect  reciprocity  represent  fundamental  aspects  of 
human interaction, both in evolutionary history and in modern life: repetition is often 
possible and reputation is usually at stake. 
 
The  Public  Goods  game  is  a  Prisoners’  Dilemma  with  more  than  two  people  (9). 
Typically there is a choice of how much to contribute to a common pool, which then 
benefits  all  participants  equally.  The  maximum  payoff  for  the  group  is  achieved  if 
everyone  contributes  the  full  amount,  but  free  riders  increase  their  own  payoff  by 2 
 
 
withholding their contribution and still benefiting from the public pool. All of us are 
engaged  in  many  public  goods  games,  on  both  large  and  small  scales.  For  example, 
reducing CO2 emissions by driving fuel efficient cars and minimizing waste is a global 
public goods game. On a more local level, public goods games include volunteering on 
school boards or town councils and helping to maintain the roads and fire department in 
your city, as well as cleaning your dishes at home and doing your share of work at the 
office.  
 
It has been suggested that costly punishment can uphold cooperation in public goods 
games (10-12). People are willing to pay a cost for others to incur a cost. Typically, such 
punishment is directed towards free riders and therefore could be a deterrent for defection 
(13-15). One problem with punishment is that it generates a social loss by reducing both 
players’ payoffs. This effect, however, could be small if sanctions are used rarely, such 
that in the long run punishment increases net payoffs by discouraging free-riding (16), or 
if  punishments  are  merely  symbolic  (17-21).  Another  problem  is  that  punishment  is 
sometimes used by free riders against cooperators, either randomly or as acts of revenge 
(22-25). Moreover, the extent to which punishment is perceived as justified can greatly 
affect the response of those who have been punished (26). These observations question 
the proposal that costly punishment is the optimal force for promoting cooperation (12). 
More generally, the substantial literature emphasizing the beneficial effects of material 
and symbolic rewards and the negative effects of sanctions on interpersonal relationships 
(27-31)  casts  doubt  on  whether  the  threat  of  costly  punishment  provides  the  most 
appropriate incentive for cooperation.  
  
In  this  study,  we  demonstrate  that  it  is  not  costly  punishment  that  is  essential  for 
maintaining cooperation in the repeated public goods game, but instead the possibility of 
targeted interactions more generally. In the normal repeated public goods game, if one 
person lowers his contribution, then I cannot directly reciprocate against this person. I 
could also lower my contribution, but this action harms everyone in the group. Ultimately 
this leads to a decline in cooperation.  Therefore, we consider public goods games where 
after each round there is also the possibility of targeted interactions with other individuals 
in  the  group.  One  such  interaction  is  costly  punishment,  but  another  one  is  costly 
rewarding, as captured by the standard Prisoners’ Dilemma game. In this scenario, I can 
reward people who have contributed in the public goods game with cooperation, but 
punish free riders with defection.  
 
In  the  course  of  daily  life,  people  are  always  involved  in  both  public  and  private 
interactions.  Opportunities  exist  for  mutually  beneficial  trade,  as  well  as  destructive 
punishment. My behavior towards others is affected by their previous decisions, both in 
the private and the public domain. If I resent my neighbor’s gas guzzling SUV, I could 
exercise costly punishment by slashing his tires. Conversely I could be extra helpful to 
my other neighbor who just bought a low-emission vehicle. Punishment is destructive, 
and carries the risk of retaliation by those who have been punished. This is particularly 
true  in  situations  where,  unlike  in  most  laboratory  studies,  interactions  are  not 
anonymous. Without the cover of anonymity, it seems probable that people would be less 3 
 
 
inclined to punish, and more likely to reward. Let us find out if rewards can lead to 
cooperation in the repeated public goods game. 
 
A  total  of  192  subjects  participated  in  our  study  at  the  Harvard  Business  School 
Computer  Lab  for  Experimental  Research  (32).  Subjects  interacted  anonymously  via 
computer screens in groups of four. Subjects were told that they would interact with the 
same three people for the whole session. We performed one control experiment and three 
treatments. 
 
In the control experiment, subjects play several rounds of a standard public goods game 
in groups of four (16 control groups). In each round, subjects receive 20 monetary units 
(MUs) and decide how much to contribute to the public pool, and how much to keep for 
themselves.  The  contributions  are  multiplied  by  1.6  and  split  evenly  among  the  four 
group members. Subjects are not told the total number of rounds. For a discussion of end-
game effects, see (32). 
 
In the three treatments, each public goods game is followed by a second stage, which 
allows for responses targeted at each other group member. These targeted interactions 
have different forms in the three treatments (32).  In the first treatment (“PN”, 10 groups) 
subjects can punish or do nothing. In the second treatment (“RN”, 11 groups) subjects 
can reward or do nothing. In the third treatment (“RNP”, 11 groups) subjects can choose 
between reward, non-action and punishment.  
 
Figure  1A  shows  the  average  contribution  to  the  public  goods  game  in  each  round. 
Consistent with previous findings we observe that the average contribution declines in the 
control experiment, but stays high in the punishment treatment, PN. However, we also 
observe that the two other treatments, RN and RNP, are equally effective in maintaining 
cooperation in the public goods game. Therefore, it is not punishment per se which is 
important for sustaining contributions, but rather the possibility of targeted interactions. 
This option is present in all three treatments, but absent in the control experiment. 
 
Figure 1B shows the percentage of the maximum possible payoff achieved in each round. 
The  maximum  payoff  is  obtained  for  full  cooperation  in  the  public  goods  game,  no 
punishment use in the PN treatment and full rewarding in the targeted rounds of the RN 
and RNP treatments. All three treatments where targeted interactions are possible out-
perform the control after an initial period of adjustment. We again find that reward works 
as well as punishment, with no significant difference in percentage of maximum possible 
payoff between the three targeted treatments. 
 
Figure 1C shows the average payoff in each round, summed over the public goods game 
and the targeted interaction. In the RN and RNP treatments there is the possibility of 
generating additional income during the targeted interactions. Thus it follows naturally 
from Figure 1B that the reward treatments, RN and RNP, generate larger absolute payoffs 
than the punishment-only treatment, PN. Groups which have the opportunity to reward do 
better than groups which can only punish. The point we want to make is this: if several 4 
 
 
targeted interactions can promote cooperation in the public goods game, then those that 
generate additional positive payoff will result in the best outcomes.  
 
Figure 2 shows the frequency of reward and punishment in each targeted round. We see 
that both options are used. We also see clear changes in punishment and reward use over 
time. In the PN and RNP treatments, punishment use decreases over time. In the RN and 
RNP treatments, reward use increases over time. Importantly, the latter finding suggests 
that rewarding is stable and does not decay over time – in contrast to findings in a setting 
where the possibility for direct reciprocity was limited by shuffling player identifiers 
from round to round (33).  
 
If  positive  reciprocity  alone  (RN)  and  negative  reciprocity  alone  (PN)  both  increase 
contributions relative to the control, one might think that putting the two together (RNP) 
would  be  best,  as  found  previously  in  a  two  player  proposer-responder  game  (34). 
However,  the  RNP  setting  shows  that  positive  and  negative  reciprocity  cannot  be 
combined in an additive way. The average contribution and percent of maximum possible 
payoff  in  RNP  are  not  significantly  different  from  that  of  RN  or  PN  (Figure  1). 
Moreover, the average total payoff in RNP is not significantly different from RN, but is 
significantly higher than PN. 
 
We can also see that when both options are available, groups which reward more earn 
higher payoffs while groups that punish more earn lower payoffs (Figure 3A,B). It could 
be  that  the  groups  who  punished  more  heavily  merely  contained  more  free-riding 
individuals, and so received lower payoffs due to bad luck as opposed to differences in 
strategy. However, we see a similar pattern when we examine the probability to punish or 
reward based on the contribution level in the public goods game (first-order conditional 
reward and punishment strategies). Groups that are more likely to reward average or 
above  average  contributors  achieve  significantly  higher  average  contributions  (Figure 
3C). Conversely, the tendency to punish low contributors has no effect on contributions 
(Figure 3D). As a result, choosing to reward good behavior leads to significantly higher 
payoffs  (Figure  3E),  while  opting  to  punish  free-riders  results  in  marginally  lower 
payoffs (Figure 3F), because punishing is costly but ineffective in the RNP treatment. 
When  both  options  are  possible,  positive  reciprocity  trumps  negative  reciprocity  for 
improving contributions in the public goods game and total payoffs.  
 
We have shown that several types of targeted interactions can stabilize contributions in 
the repeated public goods game. Most previous experiments have focused on punishment 
and examined situations where subjects cannot track the identity of other group members 
who punished them. In such settings, typically the groups are changed or the identities of 
group members are reshuffled in every round. Subjects are often informed about the total 
amount of punishment they received, but not from whom the punishment came. These 
designs reduce or eliminate effects of reputation, as well as retaliation by those who have 
been punished.    
 
Previous  studies  of  reward  versus  punishment  in  such  settings  which  limit  direct 
reciprocity  have  found  rewards  to  be  largely  ineffective  (33-36).  In  our  experiment, 5 
 
 
however, which is based on repeated interactions where future consequences discipline 
your actions today, reward is as effective as punishment. We think that this type of truly 
repeated  interaction  plays  an  important  role  in  the  study  of  human  behavior.  Our 
ancestors lived in small groups where repeated interactions were common, reputation was 
often at stake, and the identities of those that chose to punish or reward were usually 
known  (37).  Such  concerns  are  still  relevant in  today’s  world,  because  many  of  our 
actions have future consequences. This is particularly true in the context of our most 
important  interactions  with  family  members,  friends  and  co-workers.  Thus,  while  we 
sometimes find ourselves in anonymous one-shot interactions where costly punishment 
might be more effective than reward, the importance of rewards in repeated interactions 
should  not  be  overlooked.  Moreover,  other  tools  for  encouraging  cooperation  exist 
beyond  monetary  punishments  and  rewards,  such  as  ostracism  (19)  and  appeals  to 
normative values (27). The relative effectiveness of such additional mechanisms merits 
further study. 
 
Indirect reciprocity settings can also stabilize cooperation in the public goods game (38, 
39). Such experiments differ from ours in several ways and were not designed to directly 
compare punishment and reward. Moreover, in these studies, subjects are informed about 
their partner’s full history of past play with all previous partners. In our study, we show 
that private pairwise interactions, where players do not know what happens in games 
between others, can still stabilize contributions. It is useful to know that full transparency, 
which is hard to achieve in the real world, is not necessary for targeted interactions to 
promote public cooperation.   
 
A common argument for the evolution of costly punishment rests on group selection (40). 
If group selection is evoked as a mechanism for human cooperation, however, then it is 
important to note that groups which find positive interactions to maintain cooperation in 
the public goods game will outperform groups that use costly punishment. Moreover, 
cross  cultural  differences  have  been  observed  in  anti-social  punishment,  where  low 
contributors punish high contributors (24). While anti-social punishment is rare among 
subjects from the USA or UK, it was quite common in countries such as Greece and 
Oman. Thus while punishment may eventually improve payoffs in long games using 
subjects from the USA or UK, as in the present study and (16), this is almost certainly not 
the case in areas where antisocial punishment is common. Instead, anti-social punishment 
could easily result in significantly lower payoffs.  
 
While we have documented the effects that bilateral punishment and reward can have on 
multilateral cooperation, our experiment does not allow us to look at the reverse effect. 
That is, we do not know whether there is more or less bilateral reward or punishment than 
there would have been if the subjects had not also been engaged in the public goods 
game. This aspect of linking together different games has received little attention in the 
experimental literature, and deserves further study. 
 
Sometimes it is argued that it is easier to punish people than to reward them. We think 
this is not the case. Life is full of opportunities for mutually beneficial trade, as well as 
situations  where  we  can  help  others,  be  they  friends,  neighbors,  office-mates,  or 6 
 
 
strangers. We regularly spend time and effort, as well as money, to assist people around 
us. This assistance can be minor, like helping a friend to move furniture, picking up shifts 
to  cover  for  an  ill  coworker,  or  giving  directions  to  a  tourist.  It  can  also  be  more 
significant, like recommending a colleague for promotion, or speaking out to support a 
victim of discrimination. These sorts of productive interactions are the building blocks of 
our society and should not be disregarded.  
 
Our  study  allows  a  direct  comparison  of  various  kinds  of  targeted  interactions  on 
promoting public cooperation in repeated games. We find that reward is as effective as 
punishment in maintaining contributions to the public good. However, while punishment 
is costly for both parties, reward creates benefit and thus results in higher total payoffs. 
Furthermore,  when  both  punishment  and  reward  are  possible,  positive  reciprocity 
supersedes  negative  reciprocity,  and  punishing  results  in  lower  group-level  benefits. 
While  punishment  may  out-perform  rewards  in  one-shot  anonymous  interactions,  our 
findings suggest that positive reciprocity should play a more important role than negative 
reciprocity in maintaining public cooperation in repeated situations. Imagine there are 
groups  where  people  either  use  punishment  or  reward  to  induce  public  cooperation. 
Which groups will receive the highest payoffs, and therefore which incentive system is 
optimal? The results are unequivocal: rewards produce better outcomes than punishment 
in repeated settings. These findings highlight the importance of developing opportunities 
for  constructive  interactions  between  individuals,  to  help  us  prevent  tragedies  of  the 
commons.  
 
1.  R. Trivers, Q Rev Biol 46, 35 (1971). 
2.  R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation.  (Basic Books, New York, 1984). 
3.  D. Fudenberg, E. Maskin, Econometrica 54, 533 (1986). 
4.  K. Binmore, L. Samuelson, J Econ Theo 57, 278 (1992). 
5.  M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Nature 355, 250 (1992). 
6.  P. Dal Bó, American Economic Review 95, 1591 (2005). 
7.  R. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems.  (Aldine de Gruyter, New York, 
1987). 
8.  M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Nature 437, 1291 (2005). 
9.  G. Hardin, Science 162, 1243 (1968). 
10.  T. Yamagishi, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51, 110 (1986 ). 
11.  E. Ostrom, J. Walker, R. Gardner, The American Political Science Review 86, 404 
(1992). 
12.  E. Fehr, S. Gächter, American Economic Review 90, 980 (2000). 
13.  R. Boyd, P. Richerson, Ethology and Sociobiology 13, 171 (1992). 
14.  J. H. Fowler, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102, 7047 (2005). 
15.  C. Hauert, A. Traulsen, H. Brandt, M. A. Nowak, K. Sigmund, Science 316, 1905 
(2007). 
16.  S. Gächter, E. Renner, M. Sefton, Science 322, 1510 (2008). 
17.  J.  S.  Coleman,  Foundations  of  social  theory.,    (Belknap  Press  of  Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990). 
18.  C.  Boehm,  Hierarchy  in  the  forest:  The  evolution  of  egalitarian  behavior.  
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999). 7 
 
 
19.  D. Masclet, C. Noussair, S. Tucker, M. Villeval, American Economic Review 93, 
366 (2003). 
20.  T. Ellingsen, M. Johannesson, Evolution and Human Behavior 29, 100 (2008). 
21.  M. Cinyabuguma, T. Page, L. Putterman, Journal of Public Economics 89, 1421 
(2005). 
22.  L. Denant-Boemont, D. Masclet, C. Noussair, Economic Theory 33, 1432 (2007). 
23.  A. Dreber, D. G. Rand, D. Fudenberg, M. A. Nowak, Nature 452, 348 (2008). 
24.  B. Herrmann, C. Thoni, S. Gachter, Science 319, 1362 (2008). 
25.  N. Nikiforakis, Journal of Public Economics 92, 91 (2008). 
26.  Y. Cohen-Charash, P. E. Spector, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 86, 278 (2001). 
27.  K. B. Lowe, K. G. Kroeck, N. Sivasubramaniam, Leadership Quarterly 7, 385 
(1996). 
28.  E. Fehr, B. Rockenbach, Nature 422, 137 (2003). 
29.  A. D. Stajkovic, F. Luthans, Personnel Psychology 56, 155 (2003). 
30.  P.  M.  Podsakoff,  W.  H.  Bommer,  N.  P.  Podsakoff,  S.  B.  MacKenzie, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 99, 113 (2006). 
31.  D. Houser, E. Xiao, K. McCabe, V. Smith, Games and Economic Behavior 62, 
509 (2008). 
32.  Materials and methods, as well as additional analysis, are available as supporting 
material on Science Online. 
33.  M. Sefton, R. Schupp, J. M. Walker, Economic Inquiry 45, 671 (2007). 
34.  J. Andreoni, W. T. Harbaugh, L. Vesterlund, American Economic Review 93, 893 
(2003). 
35.  J. M. Walker, M. Halloran, Experimental Economics 7, 235 (2004). 
36.  M. Sutter, S. Haigner, M. G. Kocher, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5497,  (2006). 
37.  P. Wiessner, Human Nature 16, 115 (2005). 
38.  M. Milinski, D. Semmann, H. J. Krambeck, Nature 415, 424 (2002). 
39.  B. Rockenbach, M. Milinski, Nature 444, 718 (2006). 
40.  R. Boyd, H. Gintis, S. Bowles, P. J. Richerson, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 100, 
3531 (Mar 18, 2003). 
41.   We thank Magnus Johannesson for helpful comments, and Fernando Racimo and 
James  Paci  for  assistance  performing  the  experiments.  Support  from  the  Jan 
Wallander  and  Tom  Hedelius  Foundation  (AD),  the  Torsten  and  Ragnar 
Söderberg  Foundation  (TE),  the  John  Templeton  Foundation,  the  National 
Science Foundation –National Institutes of Health joint program in mathematical 
biology and J. Epstein is most gratefully acknowledged.  8 
 
 
Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1. Mean contribution to the public good (A), percentage of maximum possible payoff (B) 
and mean payoff (C) over 50 rounds of play in the control (Yellow), PN (Red), RN (Blue) and 
RNP (Green) experiments. All three treatments with targeted reciprocity succeed equally well at 
increasing contributions and percentage of maximum possible payoff relative to the control, and 
thus the reward treatments RN and RNP result in significantly higher actual payoffs than the 
punishment  treatment  PN.  All  data  are  analyzed  at  the  level  of  the  group  to  account  for 
interdependence  of  outcomes  for  members  of  a  given  group. ( A)  Sign-rank  test  comparing 
contributions in Round 1 vs Round 50: Control, p=0.028, decrease; PN, p=0.18, no change; RN, 
p=0.036, increase; RNP, p=0.033, increase. (B) Ranksum comparing percentage of maximum 
possible payoff in the second half of the game: PN vs control, p=0.013, PN higher; RN vs control, 
p=0.048, RN higher; RNP vs control, p=0.023, RNP higher; PN vs RN, p=0.67; PN vs RNP, 
p=0.46; RN vs RNP, p=0.40. (C) Ranksum comparing mean payoff in the second half of the 
game: PN vs control, p=0.013, PN higher; RN vs control, p<0.001, RN higher; RNP vs control, 
p=0.001, RNP higher; PN vs RN, p=0.001, RN higher; PN vs RNP, p=0.005, RNP higher; RN vs 
RNP, p=0.40. 
 
Figure 2. Frequency of punishment use (Red) decreases and reward use (Blue) increases over 50 
rounds of play in the PN (A), RN (B) and RNP (C) treatments. All data are analyzed at the level 
of the group to account for interdependence of outcomes for members of a given group. (A) Sign-
rank comparing punishment use in rounds 1 and 50: p=0.12; comparing rounds 1-5 and 46-50: 
p=0.073,  decreases;  comparing  rounds  1-10  and  41-50:  p=0.037,  decreases.  (B)  Sign-rank 
comparing reward use in rounds 1 and 50: p=0.018, increases; comparing rounds 1-5 and 46-50: 
p=0.033,  increases;  comparing  rounds  1-10  and  41-50:  p=0.075,  increases.  (C)  Sign-rank 
comparing move use in rounds 1 and 50: R, p=0.007, increases; P: p=0.007, decreases; comparing 
rounds 1-5 and 46-50: R, p=0.006, increases; P, p=0.004, decreases; comparing rounds 1-10 and 
41-50: R, p=0.006, increases; P, p=0.009, decreases.  
 
Figure 3. Mean payoff over the 50 rounds of play in the RNP treatment, increases with reward 
frequency (A) (Tobit, slope=12.7, p<0.001) and decreases with punishment frequency (B) (Tobit, 
slope=-7.9, p=0.030). Mean contribution to the public good increases with the average probability 
to reward players who contribute equal to or greater than the group average contribution (C) 
(Tobit, slope=22.2, p<0.001), and is not significantly related to the probability to punish below 
average contributors (D) (Tobit, slope=1.1, p=0.69). Mean payoff increases with the probability 
to cooperate with players who contribute equal to or greater than the group average contribution 
(E) (Tobit, slope=41.8, p<0.001), and decreases with the probability to punish below average 
contributors (F) (Tobit, slope=-13.2, p=0.066). Data are analyzed at the level of the group to 
account for the interdependence of outcomes for members of a given group. To correctly 
visualize the results of a multiple regression analysis, the y-axis of each panel is adjusted to 
account for the variation explained by the independent variable shown in the opposing panel 
(punishment in panels A, C, E and reward in panels B, D, F). See (32) for regression tables, axis 
adjustment details and further statistical analysis. 
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1.1 Methodological details 
 
A total of 192 subjects from Boston area colleges and universities participated voluntarily in a 
modified  repeated  public  goods  game  at  the  Harvard  Business  School  Computer  Lab  for 
Experimental  Research  (CLER).  The  lab  consists  of  36  computers,  which  are  visually 
partitioned. The participants interacted anonymously through the software z-Tree (S1) and were 
from a number of different schools and a wide range of fields of study; it was therefore unlikely 
that any subject would know more than one other person in the room. Subjects were not allowed 
to participate in more than one session of the experiment. In all, eight sessions were conducted in 
February and March 2009, with an average of 24 participants per session. Each session lasted for 
one hour. In each session, the subjects were paid a $15 show-up fee. Each subject’s final score 
summed over all rounds was converted into dollars at an exchange rate of $1=125 points. The 
experiments  were  approved  by  the  Harvard  University  Committee  on  the  Use  of  Human 
Subjects, and written informed consent was obtained from all subjects prior to beginning the 
experiment. 
 
Each  experiment  was  begun  by  reading  instructions  (included  in  the  Supplementary 
Information).  After  each  public  goods  game  round,  the  subjects  were  shown  the  amount 
contributed by each group member. In the PN, RN, and RNP treatments, subjects were then 
asked to choose a private action towards each other group member. At the end of each round, 
subjects were shown the actions taken towards them by each other group member, and their own 
payoff in the public goods game and the private round. 
 1.2 Sample Instructions (RNP setting) 
 
Instructions: 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. 
 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to ask 
us. Aside from this, no communication is allowed during the experiment. 
 
This experiment is about decision making. You have been randomly matched with 3 other people 
in the room. Neither of you will ever know the identity of the other. Everyone will receive a 
fixed amount of $15 for participating in the experiment. In addition, you will be able to earn 
more money based on the decisions you make in the experiment. Everything will be paid to you 
in cash immediately after the experiment.  
 
Based on the choices made by you and the three other people in your group, you will receive 
between $0 and $25, in addition to the $15 show-up amount. Your additional income from the 
experiment consists of an initial endowment of 50 units plus the sum of all your earnings in each 
round. The exchange rate is 125 units = $1. 
 
Each member of your group will be assigned a number (1-4) that represents his/her identity 
throughout this experiment.  
 
The Interaction: 
 
The interaction is divided into rounds. Each round consists of 2 stages.  
 
In Stage 1, you have to decide how much you want to contribute to a project that benefits all 
participants.  
 
In Stage 2, you are informed about the contributions of the other participants, and you can then 
choose actions that influence your and their earnings.  
 
 
The setup will now be explained in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Stage 1: 
 
 
Contribution to the Project: In stage 1 of each round, each person in your group is endowed 
with 20 units. You have to decide how many of the 20 units you are going to contribute to the 
project and how many of them to keep for yourself.  
 
 
The following input-screen for Stage 1 will appear: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You must enter your contribution within 20 seconds. 
 
 
 
 
 Calculation of your income in Stage 1:  
 
The contributions of all 4 players are added up. The total sum is multiplied by 1.6 and then 
evenly split among all 4 players. Each player gets the same share from the project. 
 
In  addition  to  your  earnings  from  the  project,  you  also  receive  the  units  you  chose  not  to 
contribute.  
 
Thus, your income in Stage 1 is: 
 
20 – (your contribution to the project) + 1.6 x (sum of all contributions) / 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here are two examples: 
 
Example 1: 
Each player contributes 20 units to the project.  
Then each player receives 32 units = 20 – 20 + 1.6 x (20+20+20+20)/4 
 
Example 2: 
Three players contribute 20 and one player contributes 0.  Then 
the contributing players receive           24 units = 20 – 20 + 1.6 x (20 + 20 + 20) / 4  
the non-contributing player receives    44 units = 20 –   0 + 1.6 x (20 + 20 + 20) / 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Stage 2: 
 
In this stage, you interact with each of the three other players individually.  
 
You can see the contributions of all 4 players to the project in Stage 1. 
 
You must decide between one of three possible actions, A, B or C, toward each of the three other 
players.  
 
If you choose A then you get  4 units, and the other player gets +12 units. 
If you choose B then you get +0 units, and the other player gets +0 units. 
If you choose C then you get  4 units, and the other player gets  12 units. 
 
The following screen will appear: 
 
 
 
You must decide within 60 seconds otherwise random choices will be made. 
 
Calculation of your income in Stage 2: Your income in Stage 2 is the sum of two components: 
· the number of units you have received from your decisions 
· the number of units you have received from the decisions of the other participants To summarize, every round of the experiment has two stages: 
 
Stage 1: Contribution to the project 
Each participant is endowed with 20 units. You have to decide how many of the 20 units you are 
going to contribute to the project. The remaining units will be kept in your private account. 
 
Stage 2: Pair-wise interactions 
You have to choose between one of three actions, A, B or C, toward each of the three other 
players. 
 
After Stage 1 and 2: 
 
You will see what the others have chosen when interacting with you in Stage 2.  
You will see your score from Stage 1 and Stage 2 and your total score for this round. 
The following screen will appear: 
 
 
 
Then we will move to the next round. Every round consists of the same two stages.  
You always interact with the same three people. All players keep their identification numbers. 
 
The interaction will end after an unknown number of rounds. Your behavior has no effect on the 
number of rounds.  
 
In addition to the $15 show up fee, your income from the experiment consists of an initial 
endowment of 50 units plus the sum of all your earnings in each round. The exchange rate is 125 
units = $1. 2. Supporting analyses 
 
2.1. Private interaction payoff matrices 
 
In the PN treatment’s targeted round, subjects can punish (P) or do nothing (N). Punishment 
means paying a cost of 4 MUs for the other person to lose 12 MUs. This results in the following 
payoff matrix, where the row player’s payoff is shown: 
 
 
  P  N 
P  -16  -4 
N  -12  0 
 
In  the  RN  treatment’s  targeted  round,  subjects  can  reward  (R)  or  do  nothing  (N).  This  is 
equivalent to cooperating or defecting in a standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Reward means 
paying 4 MUs for the other person to receive 12 MUs. This results in the following payoff 
matrix: 
 
  R  N 
R  8  -4 
N  12  0 
 
In the RNP treatment’s targeted round, subjects can choose between reward (R), non-action (N) 
and punishment (P). This results in the following payoff matrix: 
 
  R  N  P 
R  8  -4  -16 
N  12  0  -12 
P  8  -4  -16 
 
2.2 End-game effects: reputation concerns versus purely pro-social preferences 
 
While costly punishment has received much attention in recent years, our results suggest that the 
possibility of reciprocal actions more generally is the essential factor for promoting cooperation 
in repeated game. As opposed to measuring purely pro-social preferences, we study the ability of 
reciprocity concerns to induce pro-social behavior. Because contributions are motivated by a 
concern  for  the  future,  end-game  effects  (S2)  are  often  observed,  where  cooperation  drops 
steeply when subjects know the game is in its final round (S3-S5). In the real world, however, 
typically one does not know if there might be another interaction and therefore we feel that such 
end-game effects are less relevant. 
 
 2.3 Contribution, payoff, reward and punishment by group 
Examining the behavior of each group gives insight into the dynamics of the different settings 
(Figure S1). Of the 16 groups in the control experiment, four successfully achieve full 
contribution without any means of targeted interaction. Another seven groups maintain an 
intermediate level of contribution throughout, and the final five groups see complete breakdown 
of cooperation, with average contribution dropping to 0 and never having a consistent increase.  
In the PN treatment, one group quickly reaches full contribution without punishing, and this 
cooperation is maintained with minimal punishment use (only five punishments over the 50 
rounds of play). Seven groups achieve full contribution through punishment use in the first few 
rounds to establish cooperation, and/or subsequent spats of punishment when free-riding begins 
to appear. Two groups fail to achieve full contribution despite significant punishment use.  
In the RN treatment, four groups successfully reach full contribution in the public goods game 
and full cooperation in the targeted interaction. Four more groups converge on full contribution 
in the public goods game and reach high, but not full, levels of targeted cooperation. Thus full 
cooperation in the targeted round is not needed to maintain full contribution in the public goods 
game. Two groups maintain intermediate levels of cooperation in both the public and targeted 
interactions throughout. Interestingly, in the one group where public cooperation fails, there is 
still consistent targeted cooperation in three out of the six player pairings. In no group is the 
average level of targeted cooperation below 50%.  
In the RNP treatment, eight groups reach full public contribution and full targeted cooperation 
with minimal punishment use (5% or less). One group reaches full public contribution, but 
maintaining high contributions requires persistent punishment across the 50 rounds of play. 
Another group quickly drops to zero contribution, but after 40 rounds, an increase in targeted 
cooperation succeeds in restoring public contribution. Only in one group do contributions stay 
consistently below ten, despite non-negligible use of targeted cooperation and punishment. 
Figure S2 shows the average payoff summed over the public goods game and the targeted 
interaction for each group. The minimum and maximum payoffs in the control and PN are very 
similar. However, the lowest scoring group in RN earned more than the highest scoring group in 
PN. Again, reward clearly leads to better outcomes than punishment in the repeated public goods 
game. 
  
Figure S1. Contribution (yellow, 0-20), punishment (red, 0-1) and reward (blue, 0-1) dynamics 
by group over the 50 periods of play.  
Figure S1 (continued). Contribution (yellow, 0-20), punishment (red, 0-1) and reward (blue, 0-
1) dynamics by group over the 50 periods of play. 
Figure S2. Average payoff summed over the public goods game and targeted interaction for 
each group. 
 
2.4 Withholding reward as a form of punishment 
Both punishment and reward are forms of reciprocity, which allow subjects to create relatively 
positive or negative outcomes. Thus, the distinction between the two actions is more subtle than 
it may seem. Denying cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma is effectively a form of 
punishment; indeed, that is the conventional name for such a phase in the literature on repeated 
games. The possibility for denial of reward based on public goods game contribution can create 
‘selective incentives’ (S6), or benefits which only accrue to active contributors, to overcome the 
free-rider problem. Similarly, ostracism can sometimes function not as a costly punishment, but 
rather as a denial of reward. It may be that humans primarily punish each other by withholding 
rewards in this manner rather than by taking outright damaging actions, but as of yet we are not 
aware of experimental evidence that speaks directly to the issue. Withholding a costly reward is 
less aggressive than executing a costly punishment, and may thus damage continuing 
relationships less. If this conjecture is true, then the presence of the public goods game should 
not have much of an adverse effect on behavior in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.  
 
2.5 Further statistical analysis of relationship between contribution, payoff, reward and 
punishment 
As shown in the main text Figure 3, rewarding improve outcomes in the RNP treatment while 
punishment does not. Here we present further analysis of contribution and payoff as functions of 
probability to reward and punish. Note that one RNP group contributed fully in every period and 
never  had  the  possibility  to  punish  a  below  average  contributor,  and  thus  this  group  is  not 
included in the analysis. Tables S1, S2 and S3 present the regression models for the plots shown 
in Figure 3. Tobit regression is used because the dependent variables are bounded, contribution between 0 and 20, payoff between 0 and 56. As Tables S1, S2 and S3 show, OLS with robust 
standard errors gives equivalent results. 
 
To correctly display the relationships described in tables S1-S3, the y-axis of each panel in 
Figure 3 is adjusted to take into account the variation explained by the term of the multiple 
regression  not  shown.  For  example,  consider  Figure  3A.  The  regression  model  in  Table  S1 
shows that 
 
Payoff = 12.72 * (Reward frequency) + (-7.88) * (Punishment frequency) + 18.68                 (1) 
 
In Figure 3A, payoff is shown as a function of reward use. Equation 1 can be rearranged to 
describe the relationship between payoff and reward frequency as follows: 
 
Payoff - (-7.88) * (Punishment frequency) = 12.72 * (Reward frequency) + 18.68                 (2) 
 
Therefore, to correctly visualize the effect of reward frequency on payoff, the y-axis of Figure 
3A shows Payoff – (-7.88)*(Punishment frequency). Similarly, the y-axis of Figure 3B shows 
Payoff – (12.72)*(Reward frequency), Figure 3C shows Contribution – (1.07)*(Probability to 
punish),  Figure  3D  shows  Contribution  –  (22.22)*(Probability  to  reward),  Figure  3E  shows 
Payoff – (-13.24)*(Probability to punish), and Figure 3F shows Payoff – (41.77)*(Probability to 
reward). 
 
We now provide additional analysis of the relationship between contribution, payoff and the 
probability to reward average or above average contributors. First we show that the correlation 
between average contribution and probability to reward remains highly significant when using 
quantile  regression,  which  is  less  sensitive  to  outliers  (slope=21.3,  p=0.001),  as  does  the 
relationship  between  payoff  and  probability  to  reward  (slope=43.7,  p=0.004).  Second,  we 
strengthen the causal link between probability to reward and higher contributions and payoffs. It 
could be that the two groups which do poorly are less inclined to cooperate both in the public 
goods game and in the private round.  To demonstrate that baseline prosociality is not driving the 
relationship between contribution/payoff and reward, we include first round contribution as a 
control in the multiple regressions. We find that probability to reward remains highly significant, 
both as it relates to contribution (slope=18.7, p<0.001) and payoff (slope=34.7, p<0.001). This 
again remains true when using quantile regression, both for contribution (slope=17.8, p=0.023) 
and  payoff  (slope=32.2,  p=0.035).  Moreover,  we  find  no  significant  relationship  between 
probability  to  reward  and  first  round  contribution  (slope=0.03,  p=0.18).  This  shows  that 
rewarding behavior is not driven by the same factor as contribution behavior, and suggests that 
the tendency to reward helps sustain contribution over time. 
 
2.6 Private round strategies 
There are noteworthy differences in the way subjects use cooperation and punishment (Fig S3). 
In the PN treatment, below average contributors are more likely to be punished than average 
contributors  (Sign-rank,  p=0.005)  or  above  average  contributors  (Sign-rank,  p=0.005). 
Interestingly,  above  average  contributors  are  also  more  likely  to  be  punished  than  average 
contributors  (Sign-rank,  p=0.011).  Yet  there  is  no  significant  variation  in  the  probability  to 
receive punishment as a function  of the absolute public goods game contribution in the PN treatment (Sign-rank, p>0.10 for all comparisons). In the RN treatment, a public goods game 
contribution  below  the  group  average  is  less  likely  to  receive  cooperation  in  the  Prisoners’ 
Dilemma than an average or above average contribution (Sign-rank: Below average vs average, 
p=0.011; Below average vs above average, p=0.005). High absolute as well as high relative 
contributions are important for eliciting reward in the RN treatment. Only contributions between 
16 and 20 are more likely to receive cooperation than defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Sign-
rank: contribution 0 to 5, p=0.87; contribution 6 to 10, p=0.50; contribution 11 to 15, p=0.44; 
contribution 16 to 20, p=0.005). In the RNP treatment, we see a similar pattern to the RN and PN 
treatments. Below average public goods game contributions are less likely to receive cooperation 
than average or above average contributions (Sign-rank: Below average vs average, p=0.007; 
Below average vs above average, p=0.028), and more likely to receive punishment (Sign-rank: 
Below average vs average, p=0.011; Below average vs above average, p=0.008). Cooperation 
depends on absolute contribution, as in the RN treatment. Contributions of 0 to 5 or 6 to 10 less 
likely  to  receive  cooperation  than  defection  (Sign-rank:  contribution  0  to  5,  p=0.011; 
contribution 6 to 10, p=0.033), contributions of 11 to 15 are equally likely to receive cooperation 
or  defection  (Sign-rank,  p=0.40),  and  contribution  of  16  to  20  are  more  likely  to  receive 
cooperation  than  defection  (Sign-rank,  p=0.006).  Punishment,  however,  does  not  differ 
significantly  with  absolute  contribution,  as  in  the  PN  treatment  (Sign-rank,  p>0.10  for  all 
comparisons). Errors bars indicate standard error of the mean. All data are analyzed at the level 
of the group to account for interdependence of outcomes for members of a given group. 
 
To summarize, those who contribute less than average to the public good in the PN and RNP 
settings are more likely to be punished, regardless of the actual amount contributed. Punishment 
is determined only by the relative contribution, not by the absolute contribution (as in (S7)). In 
the RN and RNP settings, however, a high actual level of contribution is required to receive 
cooperation. In addition, people whose contribution matches the group average are most likely to 
receive  cooperation.  Thus  both  relative  and  absolute  contribution  levels  affect  cooperation 
decisions. This creates an incentive for all group members to contribute fully in the presence of 
possible rewards. These findings are consistent with previous evidence from proposer-responder 
games, where rewards are relatively ineffective in eliminating the worst behaviors, but relatively 
effective in encouraging the best behaviors (S8).    
 
Figure S3. Cooperation is typically directed at high absolute contributors, whereas punishment is 
directed at low relative contributors regardless of their absolute contribution. The probabilities of 
various targeted responses are shown depending on the recipient’s contribution in the preceding 
public goods game. Contributions relative to the group average are used in A, C, and E, while 
absolute contributions are used in B, D, and F. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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